March 01, 2005
Rhetorical Concepts II: Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca
A few weeks ago I suggested that the Blogora periodically introduce key concepts/theories in rhetorical studies. Here is an outline of some key aspects of Chaim Perelman/Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric.
Chaim Perelman (1912-1984), professor at the University of Brussels; Olbrechts-Tyteca (1900-1987), research associate.
A. Method:
1. Rejection of logical positivism (truth=formal proof or empirical verification by scientific method) for leaving value choices in the realm of interests, passions, prejudices, and myths.
2. Rejection of an a priori scheme in favor of analysis of cases of successful argument.
3. Rhetoric and dialectic are a single whole for them: dialectic as the theory of techniques of argument, and rhetoric as a practical discipline indicating how to use them to persuade people. Definition: “the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent.”
4. Causes of the decline of rhetoric [note the implicit death-resurrection metaphor]
a. Ramism
b. “bourgeois” thought’s emphasis on “evidence” [i.e. inartistic proof], including both the personal evidence of salvation required by Protestantism and the “sensible evidence” of empiricism
B. Audience:
1. “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation” ; note that this is a mental construct
2. Particular vs. universal audience: “those who are competent and reasonable.” The universal audience is “every reasonable being”; each speaker has a different conception of the universal audience, as do different cultures and time periods. Works as an inventional tool as well as a norm for differentiating good and bad arguments. [I would be inclined to redescribe this as the “reasonable person” test in the common law, or perhaps as the difference between Kantian Moralitaet and Hegelian Sittlichkeit]
3. Philosophy emerges out of the epideictic genre of oratory, which seeks to strengthen a consensus around certain values (20).
C. Where argumentation starts: with premises about the “real”:
1. facts (individual data) and
2. truths (broader principles, such as scientific, philosophical, or religious conceptions that connect facts).
3. presumptions (expectations of what is normal or likely), imposing the burden of proof on those who would dispute it; can be “common sense” or established formally (as in law).
D. Premises about “what is preferable”:
1. values: concrete and abstract. Defenders of the status quo tend to base arguments on concrete values (Edmund Burke: “the rights of Englishmen”; “Frats are contrary to the Aggie spirit”) and radicals tend to begin with abstract values (“liberty, equality, fraternity”).
2. value hierarchies (which is more important, liberty or equality?).
3. Loci (similar to Aristotle’s topoi): highly general preferences that can be used as guides to choice:
a. Locus of quantity: “Greatest good of the greatest number” arguments; “Protection of a small number of spotted owls is ridiculous compared to the number of people it would throw out of work.”
b. Locus of quality: Challenges strength of numbers: “The spotted owl’s ecological value is unique and irreplaceable. “
c. Locus of the irreparable (J. Robert Cox)
d. Locus of order (what is earlier is better than what comes later)
e. Locus of the existent (what is possible is better)
f. Locus of the person (important of autonomy, dignity, self-worth)
g. [I have added the locus of the “inevitable” in the analysis both of Marxism and of Third Wave arguments about globalization]
E. Selection of data and “presence”: the importance of engaging the imagination in argumentation (bringing before the eyes); can also work in reverse (helping us NOT see something). Establishing communion with the audience. (Figures of speech an essential part of creating a sense of presence/communion.)
1. Caesar’s bloody tunic as brandished by Antony
2. Photos of aborted fetuses or executed prisoners as "data" for a moral argument; do they help or hinder argument?
F. Techniques of association or liaison (linking premises and conclusion):
1. Quasi-logical, deductive arguments--closed or fundamentalist systems of thought tend to argue on the basic of quasi-logical deductions
a. establish an incompatibility in the opponent’s argument: “Hate is not a family value”
b. definition of terms
c. reciprocity and the rule of justice (treat like cases alike)
d. parts and wholes
e. probabilities
[f. I would add here the use of models in the social sciences, especially in economics: e.g. the supply-demand curve that “proves” that an increase in the minimum wage causes unemployment]
2. Arguments based on the structure of reality:
a. Liaisons of succession: causality, correlation, slippery slopes
b. Liaisons of coexistence: argument from authority
c. Symbolic liaisons: attack the flag=attack the US
3. Argument by:
a. Example: presupposes certain regularities of which the examples provide a concretization
b. Illustration: creates presence plus builds an inductive argument
4. Analogy and metaphor:
a. Mathematical proportion posits the equality of two relations (a/b=c/d), while in analogy we affirm that there is a similitude: a is to be as c is to d. a-b=the THEME of the analogy; c-d=the PHOROS. Phoros comes from a region different from the theme and better known than it. [Mind is to brain as software is to hardware. What does this analogy leave out? What does it help us see that previous analogies did not?]
b. Metaphor is a fusion of the domain of the theme with that of the phoros, a condensed analogy. Philosophy is always based on metaphors.
G. Techniques of dissociation:
1. Introduction of division into a concept the audience previously regarded as a single entity. “Genesis is a religious document, not a scientific document.”
2. Term I=appearance; Term II=underlying reality: this is the fundamental philosophic pair out of which the others proceed: rhetoric/dialectic, nomos/phusis, langue/parole, competence/performance.
H. Fullness of arguments and strength of arguments: each type of philosophy favors certain kinds of arguments and discounts others. Utilitarians view arguments from consequence alone as valid.
A. Method:
1. Rejection of logical positivism (truth=formal proof or empirical verification by scientific method) for leaving value choices in the realm of interests, passions, prejudices, and myths.
2. Rejection of an a priori scheme in favor of analysis of cases of successful argument.
3. Rhetoric and dialectic are a single whole for them: dialectic as the theory of techniques of argument, and rhetoric as a practical discipline indicating how to use them to persuade people. Definition: “the study of the discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent.”
4. Causes of the decline of rhetoric [note the implicit death-resurrection metaphor]
a. Ramism
b. “bourgeois” thought’s emphasis on “evidence” [i.e. inartistic proof], including both the personal evidence of salvation required by Protestantism and the “sensible evidence” of empiricism
B. Audience:
1. “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation” ; note that this is a mental construct
2. Particular vs. universal audience: “those who are competent and reasonable.” The universal audience is “every reasonable being”; each speaker has a different conception of the universal audience, as do different cultures and time periods. Works as an inventional tool as well as a norm for differentiating good and bad arguments. [I would be inclined to redescribe this as the “reasonable person” test in the common law, or perhaps as the difference between Kantian Moralitaet and Hegelian Sittlichkeit]
3. Philosophy emerges out of the epideictic genre of oratory, which seeks to strengthen a consensus around certain values (20).
C. Where argumentation starts: with premises about the “real”:
1. facts (individual data) and
2. truths (broader principles, such as scientific, philosophical, or religious conceptions that connect facts).
3. presumptions (expectations of what is normal or likely), imposing the burden of proof on those who would dispute it; can be “common sense” or established formally (as in law).
D. Premises about “what is preferable”:
1. values: concrete and abstract. Defenders of the status quo tend to base arguments on concrete values (Edmund Burke: “the rights of Englishmen”; “Frats are contrary to the Aggie spirit”) and radicals tend to begin with abstract values (“liberty, equality, fraternity”).
2. value hierarchies (which is more important, liberty or equality?).
3. Loci (similar to Aristotle’s topoi): highly general preferences that can be used as guides to choice:
a. Locus of quantity: “Greatest good of the greatest number” arguments; “Protection of a small number of spotted owls is ridiculous compared to the number of people it would throw out of work.”
b. Locus of quality: Challenges strength of numbers: “The spotted owl’s ecological value is unique and irreplaceable. “
c. Locus of the irreparable (J. Robert Cox)
d. Locus of order (what is earlier is better than what comes later)
e. Locus of the existent (what is possible is better)
f. Locus of the person (important of autonomy, dignity, self-worth)
g. [I have added the locus of the “inevitable” in the analysis both of Marxism and of Third Wave arguments about globalization]
E. Selection of data and “presence”: the importance of engaging the imagination in argumentation (bringing before the eyes); can also work in reverse (helping us NOT see something). Establishing communion with the audience. (Figures of speech an essential part of creating a sense of presence/communion.)
1. Caesar’s bloody tunic as brandished by Antony
2. Photos of aborted fetuses or executed prisoners as "data" for a moral argument; do they help or hinder argument?
F. Techniques of association or liaison (linking premises and conclusion):
1. Quasi-logical, deductive arguments--closed or fundamentalist systems of thought tend to argue on the basic of quasi-logical deductions
a. establish an incompatibility in the opponent’s argument: “Hate is not a family value”
b. definition of terms
c. reciprocity and the rule of justice (treat like cases alike)
d. parts and wholes
e. probabilities
[f. I would add here the use of models in the social sciences, especially in economics: e.g. the supply-demand curve that “proves” that an increase in the minimum wage causes unemployment]
2. Arguments based on the structure of reality:
a. Liaisons of succession: causality, correlation, slippery slopes
b. Liaisons of coexistence: argument from authority
c. Symbolic liaisons: attack the flag=attack the US
3. Argument by:
a. Example: presupposes certain regularities of which the examples provide a concretization
b. Illustration: creates presence plus builds an inductive argument
4. Analogy and metaphor:
a. Mathematical proportion posits the equality of two relations (a/b=c/d), while in analogy we affirm that there is a similitude: a is to be as c is to d. a-b=the THEME of the analogy; c-d=the PHOROS. Phoros comes from a region different from the theme and better known than it. [Mind is to brain as software is to hardware. What does this analogy leave out? What does it help us see that previous analogies did not?]
b. Metaphor is a fusion of the domain of the theme with that of the phoros, a condensed analogy. Philosophy is always based on metaphors.
G. Techniques of dissociation:
1. Introduction of division into a concept the audience previously regarded as a single entity. “Genesis is a religious document, not a scientific document.”
2. Term I=appearance; Term II=underlying reality: this is the fundamental philosophic pair out of which the others proceed: rhetoric/dialectic, nomos/phusis, langue/parole, competence/performance.
H. Fullness of arguments and strength of arguments: each type of philosophy favors certain kinds of arguments and discounts others. Utilitarians view arguments from consequence alone as valid.
Posted by jim at March 1, 2005 09:04 PM
Comments
I was rethinking through the differences between P/OT and K. Burke and realized how complementary their work is. The differences touched on in our last class concerning the "experiential" focus of Burke as compared to the European "system building" and that model seems to lay out quite nicely over Burke and P/OT. The uniqueness of P/OT to some of the other European systems is its fluidity (or "relativism" for those lovers of extremism).
For me that seems where Burke and P/OT are complementary. Burke's terministic screens mights subsume some of the systems built by the linguists and other Euro-system builders, but P/OT's heavy dependence on audience and consensus make it harder to fit into a terministic screen. Rather, it adopts terministic screens according to the audience.
Posted by: Joshua at March 1, 2005 10:59 PM
Very perceptive comment, Joshua. I think you're right about P/OT's flexibility. A Burkeian or more radical poststructuralist would contend, in response, that even a "pluralist" view is still a "screen," even though it is a "thinner" one as opposed to a "thick" one.
Posted by: jim at March 2, 2005 09:07 PM
Yes, you are right, and I would actually fall into that camp of folks who would say it is impossible to not see through a "screen." Though I'm optimistic that any "screen" can be altered or changed (very few people, it seems, see everything in the same way throughout their lifetime).
A visual metaphor that comes to mind for P/OT is the old View-Master picture reel. The theory itself would be the mechnanism that would "turn the pictures" and the pictures themselves would be the different "screens" adopted toward a given audience. Something like looking through screens-within-a-screen. The most radical poststructuralists, I think, would still complain about the "fixedness" of the P/OT model as the "view-master" but for the more pragmatic theorist, it seems to offer the most number of "screens" without having to constantly deconstruct your own apparatus for critical analysis.
To me, it seems a good balance between the overzealousness of complete objectivity and complete subjectivity because it allows for change without making change the only viable achievement.
Posted by: Joshua at March 3, 2005 08:47 AM
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